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By Disposition
RICHARD GARDELLA*
Few people remember that Clarence Darrow was a munici-
pal attorney before he became the "Great Defender." In his au-
tobiography, Darrow recalled that his legal advice as Chicago's
Corporation Counsel before the turn of the century often settled
controversy. He explained that, in his opinion, success resulted
from the fact that his words had the power of government be-
hind them and from the tendency of the courts to side with gov-
ernment.' In other words, "You can't fight City Hall." Today's
municipal lawyer can only look back on such halcyon days of
success with rueful nostalgia. Now, it seems to many embattled
local government defenders that the prevalent litigation battle
cry is "Let's sue the City."
A string of recent court cases expanding municipal liability
exposure has helped to feed a siege mentality among municipal
lawyers. Foremost in this line of decision are opinions of the
U.S. Supreme Court. First there were cases finding municipal li-
ability pursuant to an 1871 congressional enactment originally
designed to protect the rights of newly-freed slaves. Municipali-
ties became "persons" subject to federal lawsuits for alleged civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' when the nation's top
court overruled prior holdings in 1978. The decision, Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York,3 opened
the door to a flood of potential litigation. The threat was height-
ened and the liability exposure broadened by cases which quick-
ly followed.
In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that a municipality was
not protected by a "good faith" defense in section 1983 lawsuits
even though individual public officials were. The majority re-
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vealed a "deep pocket" approach to municipal liability by con-
cluding: "No longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test
of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined
fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct."4
The case, Owen v. City of Independence Missouri (Owen),5
made many observers worry that municipalities were headed for
an era of strict liability.
Owen was followed by Maine v. Thiboutot (Thiboutot), in
which the Court seemed to say any federal statutory violation
could give rise to a section 1983 lawsuit against a municipality.
Also, the Court ruled that a successful plaintiff was entitled to
attorney fees in such suits. Last year, four Westchester commu-
nities learned how serious the attorney fee problem could be-
come when they were found liable for more than $300,000 of
court-awarded legal fees for plaintiffs in a firefighter-hiring bias
case which had been settled without a full trial.7
1981 saw the onslaught checked somewhat with the Court
holding in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,8 that munici-
palities were not subject to punitive damages in section 1983
lawsuits. In addition, lower courts seemed to mitigate the "every
violation" holding of Thiboutot.
However, before municipal attorneys could enjoy the seem-
ing respite, the top court sent a boulder crashing against what
was left of municipal immunity. In Community Communica-
tions, Co. Inc. v. City of Boulder," the Court said municipalities
were subject to antitrust suit when they acted without strict
statutory authority from the state. Borrowing a line from the
lower court, Justice William J. Brennan, writing for the majority
intoned: "We are a nation not of 'city-states' but of states." The
decision was seen as a serious blow to the "Home Rule" move-
ment in this country. It also raised the spectre of treble damages
for municipalities and the open ended nature of antitrust
4. Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
5. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
6. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
7. Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 533 F.
Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); See $600,000 Vulcan Legal Fee Sought, MUN. LAW., Feb. 28,
1981.
8. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
9. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
[Vol. 3:515
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss3/6
BY DISPOSITION
legislation.
The twin furies outlined above are foreboding for munici-
palities, but they do not threaten the very existence of local gov-
ernment the way a third line of court cases does. This last line of
cases postulates a philosophy of "economic egalitarianism"
under the equal protection clause-a philosophy, which if
adopted, could inevitably lead to the demise of city hall.
School financing provided the focusing issue for this philos-
ophy and state courts, not the nation's top court, provided the
legal battle ground. The U.S. Supreme Court had earlier re-
jected the "dollar and cents" egalitarian approach to school
financing in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez (Rodriguez).10 However, that approach found support in
New York courts. Its most articulate expression came from a
careful, scholarly majority opinion of the appellate division, sec-
ond department, reputed to be one of the nation's busiest
courts.
The majority opinion, in Board of Education v. Nyquist
(Nyquist)," covers nearly fifty pages in detailing economic dis-
parity between school districts in the state. Because of that dis-
parity, which saw per pupil costs range in the state from a high
of $6300 to a low of $1000, the majority found both the equal
protection clause and the education clause of the state constitu-
tion violated.12 The argument was beguiling and on the side of
right, but one judge saw clearly the danger. He agreed that the
education clause had been violated because the patchwork of
state school financing laws could not be found to be rationally
based, but he dissented on the equal protection holding and re-
jected economic egalitarianism in state financing. He saw clearly
the danger to local government explaining:
Leaving aside, therefore, the unproved claim of pupil deprivation,
the plaintiffs are reduced to the plaint that their financial re-
sources, based on real property assessments, do not equal the re-
sources of other school districts. But this is a plight not derived
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
11. 83 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439
N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18,
1983) (Nos. 82-639 and 82-655).
12. Id. at 227, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
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from educational disadvantage; it is a common plight for a large
number of municipal units, whether county, city, town, village,
special service district, or authority. Whenever geographical area
measures the unit, it follows that the value and kind of land and
improvements within the unit will vary, and that equality of re-
sources of the units (or category of units) cannot be attained,
without at the same time destroying community lines.
The inequality of resources within school districts thus pre-
sumed, the claim of unequal protection of the law must therefore
fail, unless were are to say that the State cannot delegate a con-
stitutional function to municipalities except by equalizing the
financial burden in each municipality out of State funds. But the
delegation of State functions to its municipalities and the financ-
ing of such functions out of real property taxes levied by the indi-
vidual municipality is so much a part of the fundamental pattern
of our government that to assert a claim of a violation of equal
protection of the law, because the resources of the municipality
are unequal, is at complete odds with the historical development
of the law, as well as the elementary structure of State govern-
ment. It cannot be said, for example, that because the financial
resources of the counties of the State vastly differ, that the court
function or law enforcement function within the counties may not
be delegated by the State without the use of State funds, or that
as a consequence a constitutional violation of equal protection of
law must be implicated.
Indeed, the claim in this case of an infringement of equal
protection, if sustained, essentially would require that other con-
stitutional mandates must be similarly treated. For example, the
Constitution imposes the support of the needy on the State and
its subdivisions, to be provided 'in such manner and by such
means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.' (N.Y.
Const., art. XVII, § 1.) Again, the same constitutional strictures
are laid on the State to be discharged by the Legislature with
respect to public health (N.Y. Const., art. XVII, § 3), the care of
persons suffering from natural disorders (N.Y. Const., art. XVII,
§ 4), and public housing (N.Y. Const., art. XVIII, § 1). Thus, the
argument of the plaintiffs underpinning their claim of constitu-
tional discrimination on the ground of disparity of wealth proves
too much and would, if accepted, effectively destroy the long-es-
tablished governmental principle that the municipality can be ex-
pected to deal competently with State functions delegated to
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The judge also chided his brethren for straying from the
Rodriguez holding." Reviewing the parallel language of the state
constitution and the fourteenth amendment, he wrote:
There appears no reason to suppose that the purpose and effect
of the two provisions are or should be different ... at the same
time it is clear that the State courts must be the final arbiters of
the interpretation to be given to the State Constitution. Never-
theless, at the very least the interpretation made by the Supreme
Court of the United States concerning the meaning and effect of
the Fourteenth Amendment must be granted great respect by the
'State courts when they are called on to construe the equal protec-
tion clause of the State Constitution.
Hence, we should not only acknowledge the binding judg-
ment of the Supreme Court in San Antonio School Dist. v Rodri-
guez (411 U.S. 1) concerning the meaning of Federal equal pro-
tection, but also pay full regard to the reasoning by which that
judgment was reached by the Supreme Court, when we determine
the meaning of the equal protection article in the State
Constitution."
These words bucked a state judicial trend to seek a path differ-
ent from the nation's top court under the guise of state constitu-
tional interpretation.
The judge who foresaw the danger and gave the lesson on
constitutional interpretation in Nyquist is former Justice James
D. Hopkins. This fact comes as no surprise to the knowledgeable
municipal attorney who is acquainted with Judge Hopkins' ca-
reer - a career which involved major local government experi-
ence. The opinion was the kind of thoughtful opinion municipal
lawyers had come to expect from this distinguished jurist. It was
not a popular opinion nor one designed to satisfy any special
interest or pressure group. Of course, it did not receive much
popular attention. Headlines cannot be composed from wise
words. But the opinion had its impact. This year the court of
appeals reversed the appellate division's equal protection argu-
13. Id. at 260-61, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71 (Hopkins, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (citation omitted).
14. See supra note 10.
15. 83 A.D.2d at 288-89, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
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ment citing Judge Hopkins' opinion in Board of Education v.
Nyquist.16
Such reliance on a Hopkins dissent by the state's top court
is not an uncommon occurrence. As a matter of fact, the concur-
ring portion of Judge Hopkins' opinion below was cited by the
court of appeals dissent in Nyquist.17 This peer respect shown
Judge Hopkins could not surprise the knowledgeable municipal
lawyer. His last dissenting municipal law opinion formed the ba-
sis of a court of appeals reversal. The case, Marcus v. Baron,18
involved weighty questions of statutory construction and the
state law involving creation of villages.
Municipal lawyers were not always pleased with his deci-
sions, but they always respected his judgment. This writer re-
members a carefully crafted legal argument which dissolved
under a simple sounding question from Justice Hopkins: "But
what does the judgment say?" Eventually the import of the
question sank in and this writer knew he lost the case.
Justice Hopkins' judicial career makes one suspect that
Plautus, a Roman dramatist, was right when he said:
"Not by years but by disposition is wisdom acquired."
Judge Hopkins has that rare judicial disposition which gives
birth to wisdom. The exercise of that disposition is missed by
municipal lawyers.
16. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3532 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1983)(Nos. 82-639 and 82-655).
17. Id. at 55, 439 N.E.2d at 373, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
18. 57 N.Y.2d 862, 442 N.E.2d 437, 456 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1982).
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